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Abstract
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties,
thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, con-
ventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks pose natural threats to the security of practical
QKD. Fortunately, if the number of corrupted devices is limited, the security can be restored by
using redundant apparatuses. Here, we report on the demonstration of a secure QKD setup with
optical devices and classical post-processing units possibly controlled by an eavesdropper. We
implement a 1.25 GHz chip-based measurement-device-independent QKD system secure against
malicious devices on both the measurement and the users’ sides. The secret key rate reaches 137
bps over a 24 dB channel loss. Our setup, benefiting from high clock rate, miniaturized transmitters
and a cost-effective structure, provides a promising solution for widespread applications requiring
uncompromising communication security.
∗ These authors contributed equally to this work.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] enables the generation of information-theoretically
secure cryptographic keys between two distant parties (Alice and Bob). Its security relies
on fundamental properties of quantum mechanics together with certain assumptions [2,
3]. One crucial assumption is that Alice’s and Bob’s devices are honest, i.e., they follow
the prescriptions of the protocol and do not intentionally leak their internal information to
the eavesdropper (Eve). In view of the many hardware and software Trojan horse attacks
(THAs) against conventional cryptographic systems [4–7] reported recently, this assumption
seems however unjustified and over-optimistic. Indeed, the fabrication of QKD systems is
a complex process that may involve several parties, which design, manufacture, package
and distribute the different components. This provides Eve with multiple opportunities to
meddle with the devices. We note that even device-independent QKD [8, 9] is vulnerable to
this type of attacks based on malicious devices [10].
So far, the security of all implementations of QKD, e.g., decoy-state based BB84 schemes
[11, 12], measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [13–15] and the recent twin-field
QKD [16–19], rely on the implicit assumption that the users’ devices are honest. However,
verifying the proper functioning of all the elements within a QKD setup is probably unfeasi-
ble in practice [20]. Note that even slight modifications of a few transistors in a chip might
compromise the security. Also, Eve could circumvent any post-fabrication test by designing
attack triggers based on an unlikely sequence of events [6, 7].
A possible solution to overcome this problem and relax the security assumptions of QKD
has been recently proposed in [21]. It uses redundant devices together with secure multiparty
computation techniques [22, 23], particularly, verifiable secret sharing (VSS). The proposal
distinguishes two main types of devices: the “QKD modules” (which mainly contain the
optical/quantum components of the system) used to generate correlated raw data between
Alice and Bob via quantum communication, and the “classical post-processing (CP) units”
that post-process this data to distill a secret key. By furnishing each of Alice and Bob with
multiple QKD modules and CP units, it is possible to distribute secure keys even if some of
these devices are malicious and controlled by Eve. More precisely, the requirement is that at
least one pair of QKD modules —that is, one at Alice’s lab and one at Bob’s lab connected
to each other by a quantum channel— is honest, and more than two thirds of Alice’s (Bob’s)
CP units are honest too. Note that no security is possible with a fewer number of honest
devices. Moreover, the combination of the approach in [21] with MDI-QKD [24] enables a
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novel QKD network structure (see Fig. 1), where the central relay may be fully untrusted
and the users may have devices from corrupted vendors.
Here, we demonstrate a QKD system secure against malicious devices. On the theoretical
side, we put the ideas in [21] into practice by specifically devising a scheme with an improved
multiparty post-processing procedure that requires a single privacy amplification step and
minimises the authentication cost, thus making it more efficient and experimental-friendly.
On the experimental side, we demonstrate polarization-encoding MDI-QKD with three in-
tegrated chip transmitters, and realize such multiparty post-processing procedure based on
a VSS scheme. The chip-based MDI-QKD system is operated at a clock rate of 1.25 GHz
which is among the highest reported so far. In so doing, we demonstrate secure QKD with a
minimum of trust, i.e., the setup is robust against malicious QKD modules, CP units, and
measurement units connecting the QKD modules.
FIG. 1. Diagrammatic representation of a MDI-QKD network with multiple QKD modules and
classical post-processing (CP) units at each user. MDI-QKD allows the measurement module
to be totally untrusted, which means that there is no need for redundant measurement devices.
Meanwhile, the users possess various devices of each type, thus allowing for a restricted number
of them to be corrupted. As an example, we mark in black a possible combination of malicious
devices.
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Protocol. A naive approach against malicious devices, also based on redundancy, is to
simply take the XOR operation of the keys generated by different systems. By doing so, a
single malicious system cannot guess the final key, unless all systems are malicious. However,
such approach fails to guarantee the correctness of the final key and is suboptimal in the key
rate. Ref. [21] proposes a method which guarantees both the secrecy and the correctness of
the final key. The main idea is to use a VSS scheme [22] to protect against malicious CP
units, together with a dedicated privacy amplification technique to protect against malicious
QKD modules. In particular, we consider a scenario (see Fig. 2a), where Alice holds two
QKD modules, {QKDAj}2j=1, and four CP units, {CPAl}4l=1. This configuration protects
against one malicious device of each kind at Alice’s side. On the other hand, for simplicity,
we consider that Bob holds a single QKD module, QKDB, and a single CP unit, CPB, which
are both trusted. We carefully allocate the post-processing tasks between Alice and Bob
such that most of the required operations are actually conducted multipartily by Alice’s four
CP units. The considered protocol is described in detail in Section I of the Supplemental
Material (SM) [25].
To defeat malicious CP units, VSS allows the raw key generated by a QKD module to
be post-processed in a distributed way such that no CP unit can obtain any information
about the final key. Also, the resulting secret key length is optimal in the sense that it
matches the one attainable in the scenario with honest devices (disregarding the authentica-
tion cost). The post-processing tasks we implement multipartily include sifting, parameter
estimation, error correction (EC), error verification (EV) and privacy amplification (PA).
We note that the distributed post-processing can introduce extra authentication cost. In
order to minimise this cost, we choose a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code [26, 27]
to reconcile Bob’s key with Alice’s key and deliberately devise a protocol with minimum
authenticated communication.
On the other hand, PA [28] is applied to remove any information that could be revealed
to Eve due to the presence of malicious QKD modules. We use a single PA step to compress
the concatenation of the sifted keys obtained from the raw data provided by {QKDAj}2j=1,
to get a final secret key. Toeplitz matrices acting as two-universal hash function are selected
by a random bit string (RBS) generation protocol [25], which is also performed by all four
CPAl distributedly.
In the presence of malicious devices, the finite-key secret length of, say, the j-th QKD
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pair, can be written as [25]
lj =
⌊
Sj,L11,Z
[
1− h(φj,U11,Z)
]
− λjEC − tEV − log2
(
1
42PAδ
)⌋
(1)
where Sj,L11,Z (φ
j,U
1,Z) is a lower (upper) bound on the number of single-photon contributions
(single-photon phase-error rate) in the sifted keys, h(·) is the binary entropy function, λjEC
is an upper bound on the number of bits revealed by EC, tEV is the size of the EV tag, PA
is the error probability of the PA step and δ ∈ (0, 1).
The parameter estimation step builds on the finite decoy-state bounds derived in [29] and
is redundantly performed by three CPAl to assure the presence of a majority of honest units
in the process. The reader is referred to Section II of the SM [25] for more details on the
parameter estimation and the finite-key analysis.
FIG. 2. a. Depiction of the experimental MDI-QKD setup. Alice holds two QKD modules,
{QKDAj}2j=1, and four CP units, {CPAl}4l=1, and, for simplicity, Bob has one QKD module,
QKDB, and one CP unit, CPB, which are assumed to be trusted. This setup protects against one
malicious device of each kind at Alice’s side, as well as against a malicious Charles. b. Schematic
of the Si chip. It integrates an intensity modulator (IM), a polarization modulator (POL) and a
variable optical attenuator (VOA). See the main text for the detailed description of the different
elements.
Setup. The experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 2a. Each QKD module consists
of an off-chip distributed feedback (DFB) laser, together with a silicon photonic chip (see
Fig. 2b). For j = 1, 2, the j-th pair of QKD modules (QKDAj ,QKDB) implements a chip-
based polarization-encoding MDI-QKD link. An optical switch at Alice’s station allows
to select the operating QKD module, i.e., QKDA1 or QKDA2 . Pulses from Alice and Bob
interfere at a linear-optics Bell state measurement (BSM) device within Charles’ node.
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Alice (Bob) independently gain-switches a 1550 nm DFB laser diode to generate 1.25 GHz
phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (PR-WCPs) with a full width at half maximum
(FWHM) of 163 ps. A Hong-Ou-Mandel interference visibility of 47.4% is achieved at
Charles’ node without using the laser injection technique [13]. This benefits from a sharp
flat-top narrowband (5 GHz) tunable filter. The center wavelength and bandwidth of the
filter have been selected carefully in order to achieve a high interference visibility, which is
crucial to obtain a low quantum bit error rate (QBER) in MDI-QKD. This greatly reduces
the complexity of the source and may benefit the integration of the laser diode onto the
chip [30, 31].
Each transmitter chip (Fig. 2b) is fabricated in a standard Si photonic foundry process
offered by IMEC. It integrates a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) acting as an intensity
modulator (IM), a three-stage p-i-n diode acting as a variable optical attenuator (VOA), and
a polarization rotator combiner (PRC) combined with an additional stage of MZI operating
as a polarization modulator (POL). In particular, the PRC is realized by a chip-to-fiber
2D grating coupler and the active components of the IM and POL include a thermo-optic
modulator, which provides the bias, and an electro-optic modulator, which has a modulation
bandwidth of 21 GHz. By harnessing multimode interferometers (MMI), the MZI-type IM
demonstrates a dynamic extinction ratio (ER) of 19 dB. Such ER allows the lowest and the
largest intensities to differ in about two orders of magnitude, which suffices for a tight decoy-
state parameter estimation. The VOA attenuates the generated light to single-photon level,
and it is laid before the POL to prevent polarization-dependent loss. Also, to prevent optical
THAs [32–34], an off-chip isolator is added too. The POL has a dynamic polarization ER of
20 dB; this guarantees a high-fidelity preparation of the four BB84 polarization states. The
generation of such states at a GHz clock rate is a quite challenging experimental task. For
this purpose, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) board with an analog circuit (AC)
and a digital circuit (DC) is designed [35], featuring 7.5 Vpp and low modulation noise.
Charles performs a BSM using a 50:50 beam-splitter (BS), two polarization beam-splitters
(PBS) and four superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPD). According to
our measurement, the total insertion loss of the BSM is 1.1 dB and the quantum efficiency
of the SNSPD is 49.5%. A successful measurement event occurs when two SNSPDs asso-
ciated to orthogonal polarizations are triggered. To achieve good interference, the photons
must have the same polarization, timing, and spectrum modes. Three electrical polarization
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controllers (EPC) are used to align Alice’s and Bob’s polarization reference frames with a
precision up to 28 dB. Regarding the timing mode, a clock board distributes synchronized
clock signals among all stations with a root-mean-square jitter of 8 ps. The FPGA DC
module can adjust the delay in steps of 1.5 ps, which is accurate enough compared to the
PR-WCP FWHM. Thirdly, the spectra of the laser diodes are matched by tuning the driving
current and the temperature. The temperature is stabilised by a proportionalintegralderiva-
tive loop with an instability of 3 mK. Considering the temperature coefficient of the DFB
laser (0.09 nm/K), a good spectrum overlap is maintained throughout the experiment.
Results. In the experiment, the quantum communication runs over an emulated atten-
uation of 12 dB—corresponding to about 60 km of standard fiber—on each side. For both
QKD pairs, (QKDAj ,QKDB) with j = 1, 2, the four intensities MDI-QKD protocol [36] is
implemented, where Alice and Bob use a single signal intensity in the Z basis (devoted to
key generation) and three decoy intensities in the X basis (devoted to parameter estima-
tion). Fig. 3 shows the achieved experimental secret key rate together with a simulation
of the secret key rate as a function of the channel loss for a channel model matching the
experimental parameters. These parameters are shown in Section III of the SM [25].
We run the experiment for 16000 seconds per QKD pair (or, equivalently, we send a total
number of N = 2×1013 pulses per QKD module in each pair). Overall, we observe a typical
QBER of 2.1% (27.9%) in the Z (X) basis and extract a total secret key of 4386592 bits.
The secret key rate is 1.1×10−7 bits per pulse or 137 bits per second. Notably, in Fig. 3, we
show that the cost of the extra classical authentication is negligible compared to the total
secret key length. Therefore, the resulting secret key rate is approximately half of what
could have been obtained with the same amount of quantum communication but assuming
all the devices to be honest. This feature comes from the need to discard the key generated
by the potentially malicious QKD pair via PA.
To further illustrate our results, we consider that Alice uses her final key SA to encrypt
a message m with the one-time pad scheme and sends the encrypted message to Bob. To
reconstruct SA, Alice herself collects all the shares held by her CP units and then applies
majority voting followed by an XOR operation. Also, we assume that, say, QKDA1 and
CPA1 are dishonest. In particular, this implies that the sifted key of the first pair, Z
1
A, and
the second, third and fourth shares of Z2A could be known to Eve. Since, in addition, the
privacy amplification function hPA is made public, Eve could apply hPA on the concatenation
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FIG. 3. Simulation (lines) and experimental result (solid black triangle) of the secret key rate as
a function of the channel loss. The achieved experimental secret key rate for a total emulated
channel loss of 24 dB is 1.1 × 10−7 bits/pulse. The solid line corresponds to a simulation of the
secret key rate in the setting with dishonest devices described by the experiment. The dashed line
corresponds to the standard setting where the parties assume that all their devices are honest. The
secret key rate in this latter scenario roughly doubles the one with dishonest devices. This is so
because of the need to discard the key generated by the potentially malicious QKD pair via PA
when dishonest devices are considered. Moreover, this approximate factor two shows that the extra
authentication cost required in the experiment due to the use of redundant devices is negligible.
[Z1A,
⊕4
k=2 Z
2
A,k] (where Z
2
A,k stands for the k-th share of Z
2
A), which compresses all the
information about ZA held by the malicious devices. However, it can be shown that the
resulting string, say SE = hPA([Z
1
A,
⊕4
k=2 Z
2
A,k]), is totally uncorrelated to Alice’s final key
SA = hPA(ZA). As a consequence, the outcome of Eve’s decryption attempt SE ⊕ SA ⊕m
is a fully random string totally uncorrelated to m. Fig. 4 exemplifies this decorrelation by
using a picture as the plain message m and showing that Eve’s attempt to decrypt the figure
with SE yields a white noise picture. Of course, a similar conclusion follows for any other
combination of corrupted devices, as long as a single QKDAj (CPAl) is corrupted at most.
Discussion. Our experiment demonstrates the feasibility of secure QKD in the presence
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BobAlice
Decryption
Eve
m m ⊕ SA m ⊕ SA⊕ SB
m ⊕ SA⊕ SE
OursStandard
a
b
FIG. 4. a. Encryption and decryption with the shared secret key. Alice encrypts a 300 × 300
pixels grayscale image of a panda, m, with her final key, SA, and the one-time pad encryption
scheme. Bob decrypts the image correctly using his final key SB = SA. b. Illustration of Eve’s
failed attempt to decrypt the encrypted picture. Despite Eve’s significant knowledge about the
sifted key, ZA, due to both her possible intervention in the quantum channel and the information
revealed by the corrupted devices —assumed to be QKDA1 and CPA1 for illustration purposes
here—, her attempt to decrypt the intercepted picture using SE (defined in the main text) yields
a white noise output, fully uncorrelated to the actual picture. However, if, as in standard QKD,
only one QKD module and one CP unit are used, Eve’s attempt is successful unless both of them
are honest.
of a restricted number of optical devices and post-processing units possibly corrupted and
controlled by Eve. The QKD protocol we have implemented is a chip-based MDI-QKD
scheme operating at a high clock rate. Following the proposal in [21], the use of redundant
QKD modules and CP units allows us to combine VSS techniques [23] with PA [28] in order to
establish the security of the final keys. To be precise, the experiment shows that the typical
post-processing steps standard in QKD can be implemented multipartily in a distributed
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way if necessary. Although, for simplicity, our scheme only protects against one corrupted
QKD module (CP unit) at Alice’s side, it could easily be extended to protect against more
corrupted devices both at Alice’s and Bob’s labs. Also, the only essentially different task
implemented at Bob’s side in our experiment, that is to say, the decoding algorithm of
EC, can be executed multipartily too. For completeness, we have also demonstrated this
alternative using Alice’s CP units, and a detailed explanation is given in the SM. The
implemented protocol can also be combined with a twin-field QKD protocol [37] to enhance
both the security and the distance.
The trade-off we pay is in terms of secret key rate and equipment, although it is not critical
in either case. Indeed, in order to provide the highest level of security —as promised by QKD
theorists—, such sacrifices are probably more than justified by the increasing frequency and
variety of security breaches affecting conventional communication systems. In this scenario,
the reported experiment is a solid step forward towards foiling an unpreventable loophole in
the security of QKD.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
I. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We follow the efficient MDI-QKD scheme proposed in [1]. In this scheme, Alice and Bob
use a single signal intensity for the basis Z, devoted to key extraction, and perform param-
eter estimation with the basis X alone, for which they use three different signal intensities.
We shall use the nomenclature of “QKD modules” and “CP units” presented in the main
text and originally introduced in [2]. In the experiment, Alice holds two QKD modules,
{QKDAj}2j=1, and four CP units, {CPAl}4l=1, and we assume that one device of each kind
might be corrupted at most. For simplicity, Bob holds a QKD module, QKDB, and a CP
unit, CPB, and we assume that both devices are trusted. In this scenario, two combinations
of “QKD pairs” are used in the protocol: (QKDA1 ,QKDB) and (QKDA2 ,QKDB). A QKD
pair is corrupted if one of its modules is, which means that one of the previous QKD pairs
might be corrupted at most (since at most one of Alice’s QKD modules might be corrupted).
A schematic of the setup is shown in Fig. 5.
In what follows, we describe the implemented QKD protocol step by step, from the quan-
tum communication to the classical post-processing. For simplicity, the description assumes
that the corrupted devices do not deviate from the protocol prescriptions. Nevertheless, as
explained in the main text, the use of VSS [3] and privacy amplification techniques guarantee
the security of the protocol against misbehaving corrupted devices. This said, the protocol
runs as follows.
For j = 1, 2, QKDAj and QKDB create the pairs of strings (r
j, aj) and (r′j, bj), re-
spectively. While rj and r′j ∈ {0, 1}N are fully random, aj and bj ∈ {λ, µ, ν, ω}N verify
P [aji = λ] = P [b
j
i = λ] = qZ and P [a
j
i = a] = P [b
j
i = a] = (1 − qZ)pa, for a ∈ {µ, ν, ω}
and i = 1, 2, ..., N . For convenience, we define A = {µ, ν, ω}. On each side, the intensity λ
determines the use of the basis Z, and the basis X is used otherwise.
Let us now focus on a single QKD pair, say, the j-th one (j = 1, 2). For i ranging from
1 to a pre-specified number of rounds, N , steps 1 to 6 are repeated.
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1. State preparation. QKDAj (QKDB) prepares a phase-randomised weak coherent
pulse (PR-WCP) with intensity aji (b
j
i ) in the BB84 state defined by both a
j
i and the
bit value rji (b
j
i and the bit value r
′j
i ).
2. Transmission. QKDAj and QKDB send the states to Charles via the quantum chan-
nel.
3. Measurement. If Charles is honest, he measures the received signals with a Bell
state measurement (BSM). In any case, he sends the list of indexes of the successful
BSM rounds, Ij and the state information sj to both modules. If he is honest, sij = 0
(sij = 1) if a successful BSM associated to the state |ψ−〉 (|ψ+〉) occurred. Note that
in the experiment we use a standard linear optics BSM, and therefore, only |ψ−〉 and
|ψ+〉 can be post-selected.
4. Distribution of data. QKDB communicates b
j|Ij and r′j|Ij (i.e., the restrictions of
bj and r′j to the set of rounds indexed by Ij) to CPB. Let aj|Ij denote the restriction
of aj to the non-zero entries of Ij too, and let rj|Ij ,X (rj|Ij ,Z) be the restriction of rj to
the set of rounds indexed by Ij where QKDAj used basis X (Z). QKDAj communicates
sj, a
j|Ij and rj|Ij ,X directly to every CPAl , but uses the Share protocol of a VSS scheme
to distribute shares of rj|Ij ,Z among them (see the post-processing section below). All
CPAl pairwise check the consistency of their copies of sj, a
j|Ij and rj|Ij ,X through
authenticated channels. If a CPAl finds an inconsistency, it raises a complaint through
a (possibly simulated) broadcast channel and QKDAj broadcasts sj, a
j|Ij and rj|Ij ,X
to all the CPAl .
5. Sifting. CPB sends b
j|Ij and r′j|Ij ,X (defined identically as rj|Ij ,X but with respect
to r′j) to the first three units of Alice, {CPAl}3l=1, through authenticated channels.
We refer to this particular set of three CP units at Alice’s side as A in what follows.
Every unit in A builds a string of coincidences, Zj, such that the k-th bit Zkj = 1 if
ajk = b
j
k = λ, and Zkj = 0 otherwise, where k ranges the set of rounds indexed by Ij.
Similarly, every unit in A builds the strings X a,bj such that X a,b,kj = 1 if ajk = a, bjk = b
(with a, b ∈ A), and X a,b,kj = 0 otherwise. Each unit in A discards all the zero-entry
data in order to sift:
(a) its shares of rj|Ij ,Z into shares of the sifted key ZjA = rj|Zj ,
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(b) the raw data rj|Ij ,X (r′j|Ij ,X) into the set of strings
{
rj|Xa,bj
}
a,b∈A
({
r′j|Xa,bj
}
a,b∈A
)
used for parameter estimation.
Note that, by definition of the Share protocol, all three units in A hold the fourth share
of ZjA. Each of them applies the adequate bit flips on its copy of this share to properly
correlate the sifted key ZjA with r
′j|Zj , according to sj (see [9, 10]). Identically, each
of them performs the adequate bit flips on the parameter estimation strings rj|Xa,bj
(a, b ∈ A) to properly correlate them with the corresponding strings of Bob, r′j|Xa,bj ,
according to sj.
6. Parameter estimation. For every a, b ∈ A, each unit in A computes the numbers
of errors
ea,bj =
|Xa,bj |∑
k=1
rjk|Xa,bj ⊕ r
′j
k|Xa,bj . (2)
Here, rjk|Xa,bj (r
′j
k|Xa,bj ) denotes the k-th bit of the corresponding string. Finally, using
|Zj|, |X a,bj | and ea,bj , each unit in A computes a lower bound, Sj,L11,Z, on the number of
single-photon successes in Zj and an upper bound, φj,U11,Z, on the single-photon phase-
error rate associated to the single-photon successes in Zj. Then, each unit in A checks
if [4]
lj =
⌊
Sj,L11,Z
[
1− h(φj,U11,Z)
]
− λjEC − tEV − log2
(
1
42PAδ
)⌋
(3)
is greater than zero, where h(·) is the binary entropy function, λjEC is an upper bound
on the number of bits revealed by error correction (EC), tEV = 64 bits is the size of the
error verification (EV) tag, PA is the error probability of the privacy amplification,
and δ ∈ (0, 1) (see the next section of this Supplemental Material for further details).
If lj ≤ 0, each unit in A complains and QKDAj aborts the protocol. Otherwise, each
unit in A communicates Zj and lj to CPA4 , which applies majority voting (MV) on
both items and constructs its shares of the sifted key ZjA too. Similarly, each unit in
A sends Zj to CPB. CPB applies MV to decide on a single copy of Zj and uses this
copy to sift its raw string r′j|Ij ,Z into the sifted key ZjB = r′j|Zj .
Once steps 1 to 6 are performed for j = 1, 2 (and if the protocol does not abort),
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all CPAl hold shares of the concatenated string ZA = Z
1
AZ
2
A, while CPB holds the
concatenation ZB = Z
1
BZ
2
B.
7. Random permutation. In order to prevent burst errors that could cause the failure
of the information reconciliation (IR) step, each unit randomly permutes the bytes of
the sifted key shares using a permutation matrix known a priori to all of them. This
matrix can be reused in arbitrarily many sessions.
8. Information reconciliation. Each CPAl constructs its shares of the syndrome
syA = [sy(Z
1
A), sy(Z
2
A)], where sy(·) is a linear function prescribed by a low den-
sity parity check (LDPC) code [15, 16] for a prefixed QBER, and all of them jointly
reconstruct syA via the Reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme (see the toolbox section
in this Supplemental Material). Coming next, all four units perform a RBS generation
protocol to select the two-universal hash functions hEV (to be used for error verifica-
tion) and hPA (to be used for privacy amplification). The output length of hEV is set
to tEV = 64 bits and the output length of hPA is set to l = min{l1, l2} (see the next
section in this Supplemental Material for a justification of this). Then, all four units
individually compute their shares of the EV tag, hEV(ZA), and later on reconstruct
it via the Reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme. In a single communication to CPB,
every unit in A send:
(a) The syndrome information syA, a description of hEV and the EV tag hEV(ZA).
(b) The description of hPA.
CPB decides on each item via MV. Using syA = [sy(Z
1
A), sy(Z
2
A)] and ZB = Z
1
BZ
2
B,
CPB implements the decoding scheme of the LDPC code —based on a log-likelihood
ratio belief propagation algorithm— to construct its reconciled string ZˆB = Zˆ
1
BZˆ
2
B.
Importantly, the decoding scheme is applied separately for j = 1 and j = 2 from
the respective syndromes. Then, CPB computes the EV tag hEV(ZˆB). If hEV(ZˆB) 6=
hEV(ZA) it aborts the protocol.
9. Privacy amplification. In case of no abortion, CPB computes Bob’s final key SB =
hPA(ZˆB). Similarly, if no abortion is notified, all of Alice’s units compute their shares
of Alice’s final key, SA = hPA(ZA), by applying hPA to their shares of ZA.
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FIG. 5. Schematic of the setup implementing the protocol presented in the main text. While
Alice holds two QKD modules, {QKDAj}2j=1, and four CP units, {CPAl}4l=1, Bob holds a single
module, QKDB, and a single unit, CPB, for simplicity. Each pair of modules, (QKDAj ,QKDB)
with j = 1, 2, is used to implement a MDI-QKD link using Charles’ central node. The two pairs
of keys generated by these links are post-processed by the CP units. Precisely, on Alice’s side,
the post-processing is performed in a multiparty setting using all four units {CPAl}4l=1, while, for
simplicity, a standard single-party post-processing is applied on Bob’s side. In this scenario, the
protocol presented in the main text is secure if one of Alice’s QKD modules and/or one of Alice’s
CP units are corrupted at most. The quantum channels are marked with dashed blue arrows, while
every other arrow in the figure is solid and represents a classical channel. All of Alice’s units are
connected to each other by links which are assumed to be physically shielded and to connect only
the desired units. Thus, further encryption and authentication is not required for them. The same
applies to the links that connect a QKD module to a CP unit inside each lab, through which the
raw key material and some protocol information is sent to the units for the post-processing. The
classical links connecting a CPAl with CPB are authenticated (solid purple arrows). Finally, the
central node (Charles) is untrusted and thus no assumptions are made about the classical links
between this node and the QKD modules.
II. SECRET KEY LENGTH AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION
A full derivation of the extractable secret key length in a slightly more general protocol
than the one considered above is given in [4], and the bulk of the mathematical deriva-
tion presented there is standard in QKD. To be precise, it builds up on the leftover-hash
lemma against quantum side information [5] and the uncertainty relation for smooth en-
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tropies [8], together with two chain inequalities respectively presented in [6] and [7]. For the
protocol above, it follows that one can extract l sec-secret, cor-correct key bits via privacy
amplification with 2-universal hashing, for [4]
l = 32×
⌊
min{l1, l2}
32
⌋
and for all sec ≥ ˆsec + AU, cor ≥ ˆcor + AU (4)
where ˆsec = 2ε+ δ+ PA, AU is the total error probability of the authentication (computed
in the final section), ˆcor = 2
−tEV+1 × |ZA| and we shortened the key length to be a multiple
of 32 because it is a restriction of our PA scheme. Note that lj, PA and δ were already
presented in Eq. (3). As for ε, it denotes the error probability of the parameter estimation
step. Precisely, if we denote the pair index corresponding to the honest QKD pair by j = J ,
ε is upper bounded by the sum of the error probabilities of the one-sided statistical bounds
SJ ,L11,Z and φ
J ,U
11,Z. The parties pre-agree on a common parameter estimation error that applies
to both j = 1 and j = 2. Therefore, ε matches this pre-agreed value.
Although, as stated above, the reader is referred to [4] for a step-by-step derivation of
Eqs. (3) and (4), the idea behind the structure l = min{l1, l2} in Eq. (4) is that, in the
presence of an honest QKD pair which certainly delivers faithful protocol information for
the parameter estimation, min{l1, l2} is guaranteed to be a valid lower bound on lJ , which
indeed defines the key length extractable via PA.
Regarding the parameter estimation procedure, we use the decoy-state bounds derived
in [10]. Importantly though, while the protocol in [10] uses three intensity settings for each
basis (Z and X), we recall that our experiment follows the efficient MDI-QKD scheme pro-
posed in [1]. Therefore, we combine the bounds in [10] with various standard results in large
deviation theory —the Chernoff bound (see for instance [11]), the Serfling inequality [12]
and the inverse Chernoff bound [13]— to complete the parameter estimation. In fact, very
minor changes allow to adapt the explicit formulas for Sj,L11,Z, φ
j,U
11,Z and ε in [4] to the reported
experiment.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
The quantum communication run for 16000 seconds for each QKD pair, with an emulated
attenuation of 12 dB on each side. We choose the decoy intensity settings as {λ, µ, ν, ω} =
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{0.23, 0.23, 0.047, 0.005}, qX = 0.41 and {pµ, pν , pω} = {0.2, 0.6, 0.2}, which are near to the
optimal settings according to a typical channel model. For example, we select λ = µ for
simplicity, as the resulting performance is very similar to that corresponding to the optimal
intensities. Tabs. I, II and III show the measured counts and the error rate of the Z (X)
basis for both QKD pairs.
TABLE I. Measured counts and errors in the rectilinear basis
j 1 2
|Zj | 109759094 111149334
ej/ |Zj | 2.30% 2.13%
TABLE II. Measured counts in the diagonal basis
j = 1 j = 2∣∣∣X a,bj ∣∣∣ µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 4124600 4497145 1093752 4124576 4492161 1089912
ν 4465220 1550736 163836 4470030 1544726 160096
ω 1075116 157763 1997 1079895 159422 2181
TABLE III. Measured QBER in the diagonal basis
j = 1 j = 2
ea,bj /
∣∣∣X a,bj ∣∣∣ µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 27.33% 37.81% 48.79% 26.85% 37.13% 48.13%
ν 37.42% 28.29% 44.82% 37.59% 27.91% 43.15%
ω 48.51% 43.56% 37.36% 48.65% 44.53% 36.50%
Using |Zj| ,
∣∣∣X a,bj ∣∣∣ and ea,bj , the parameter estimation procedure described in the previous
section outputs Sj,L11,Z and φ
j,U
11,Z . Here we use a code rate R of 81% for the EC (suitable for a
QBER ≈ 2.5%). In principle, this leads to a syndrome of λjEC = |sy(ZjA)| = d(1−R) · |Zj|e
bits in Eq. (3). However, EC requires to divide the sifted key in blocks of length M = 216,
and it further requires the syndrome of each block to be a multiple of 8. Therefore, we
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pad both sifted keys and the syndromes of their blocks with zeros in order to match
these conditions. As a consequence, one must replace |Zj| by M d|Zj| /Me and λjEC by
d|Zj| /Me × 8 d(1−R)M/8e. Finally, lj is computed using Eq. (3) with δ = PA = ˆsec/46.
The denominator 46 follows because we set a common value for every contribution to
ˆsec = 2ε+ δ + PA, and ε contains 22 parameter estimation error terms [4]. The results are
shown in Tab. IV.
TABLE IV. Parameter estimation results and extractable secret key length for each QKD pair.
Sj,L11,Z (φ
j,U
11,Z) denotes a lower (upper) bound on the number of single-photon successes (single-photon
phase-error rate) in the sifted key, and ˆsec (ˆcor) is the secrecy (correctness) parameter of the final
keys disregarding the overall authentication error probability, AU.
j Sj,L11,Z φ
j,U
11,Z ˆsec ˆcor lj
1 50654051 0.1105
10−8 2.4× 10−11
4386592
2 50887187 0.1075 4694048
We remark that the total error probability of the authentication of the classical commu-
nications, AU (quantified in the last section of this Supplemental Material), contributes to
both sec and cor, as stated in Eq. (4). As we shall see below, while sec = ˆsec + AU ≈ ˆsec,
cor = ˆcor + AU ≈ AU. That is to say, the correctness parameter is dominated by the
authentication term.
Finally, the experimental secret key rate is computed as
K =
l − lAU
2N
, (5)
where lAU is the secret key length consumed for the authentication of the classical commu-
nications (computed in the last Section of this Supplemental Material). Also, we recall that
l is the extractable key length (given in Eq. (4)) and N = 2× 1013 is the number of signals
transmitted per QKD session.
IV. DATA POST-PROCESSING
In order to verify the BSM events correctly, the timing of the detection events is reg-
istered with a synchronization signal from the clock board. For this purpose, we use a
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Swabian Instrument Time Tagger Ultra. This allows to extract the coincidence events with
a coincidence window of 400 ps, which covers more than a 99.7% of the Gaussian pulse while
maintaining the QBER relatively low.
After the QKD session and the distribution of the necessary data, the multiparty data
post-processing in our protocol has the following steps in order: sifting, parameter esti-
mation, random permutation, information reconciliation (IR), error verification (EV) and
privacy amplification (PA). The overall procedure is similar to a typical one in [17], although
some techniques are drawn from classical secure multiparty computation (MPC).
In our implementation, we use a particular class of two-universal hash functions —
Toeplitz matrices— to perform EV, PA and authentication, although there exist differences
in the construction of the matrices and the source of the random bits in each case.
On the one hand, the CPAl use an RBS generation protocol (see the toolbox section in
this Supplemental Material) to randomly select the EV Toeplitz matrix, hEV, and the PA
Toeplitz matrix, hPA. In the first place, hEV is constructed following a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR) technique [18]. With this method, an EV tag of pre-agreed length tEV = 64
bits is computed with a matrix hEV specified with 128 random bits. In the second place, hPA
is a fully random Toeplitz matrix. Its specification requires (n + l − 1) random bits, where
n is the input length of the PA, which is 220987392 bits (length of the concatenation of the
padded sifted keys) and l is the output length of the PA determined by Eq. (4), 4386592
bits.
On the other hand, the authentication scheme is explained in detail in Sec. VII of this
Supplemental Material. The scheme requires every unit in A to pre-share a pool of secret
key bits with CPB, and these dedicated pools are the source of randomness required for the
authentication of the classical messages. In fact, the authentication of any given classical
message is formally identical to EV, in the sense that the authentication tags (whose length
is also fixed to 64 bits) are also computed using LFSR-based Toeplitz matrices. We remark
though that such matrices are built drawing secret bits from the dedicated key pools.
As stated in Section III of this Supplemental Material, prior to IR, each sifted key is
divided in blocks of 216 bits (padding the last block with zeros) and randomly permuted to
prevent burst errors that may cause the failure of the IR. We remark that the permutation
matrix is publicly selected a priori. Coming next, IR is also performed blockwise. In the
first place, EC is conducted using a LDPC code, whose syndrome information is prescribed
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based on irregular graphs [15]. The length of the syndrome for each block is determined by
the code rate R of the LDPC code, and the syndromes are padded with zeros in order to
contain an integer number of bytes. In particular, we select a code rate R = 81%, which
suffices to correct a prefixed threshold QBER of 2.5%. After obtaining the syndromes, CPB
implements the decoding scheme of the LDPC code —based on a log-likelihood ratio belief
propagation algorithm [19]— to construct its reconciled string ZˆB = [Zˆ
1
B, Zˆ
2
B]. We note,
however, that the decoding algorithm could also be implemented in a distributed way. That
is, CPB could perform the syndrome calculation and Alice’s units could execute the decoding
algorithm. In fact, we also demonstrated this alternative experimentally, as explained in the
next section.
V. DISTRIBUTED ERROR CORRECTION DECODING
Despite EC is performed by Bob in the actual experiment, for completeness we have
separately implemented the decoding algorithm of EC also in a distributed way using Alice’s
CP units. Here, we briefly explain how this alternative decoding works. First of all, since
EC is implemented independently for each pair of sifted keys, for the explanation it suffices
to focus on, say, the first pair, (Z1A, Z
1
B). Let eˆ
1 be the error pattern between Z1A and Z
1
B,
such that Z1A ⊕ Z1B = eˆ1. In the original approach described in the main text, the CPAl
compute sy(Z1A) distributedly and send it to CPB, which applies the decoding algorithm
of the EC protocol to identify the most likely string eˆ1 from the pair of inputs Z1B and
sy(Z1A). We remark that, since CPB is assumed to be honest, the fact that it knows ZB does
not compromise security. Nevertheless, if the EC decoding is implemented at Alice’s side
instead, the decoding algorithm should be implemented in such a way that none of her units
can learn Z1A. For this, the procedure must be slightly modified in order not to compromise
security. Precisely, using the fact that
Z1A ⊕ Z1B = eˆ1 ⇐⇒ Z1A,4 ⊕
(
Z1A,1 ⊕ Z1A,2 ⊕ Z1A,3 ⊕ Z1B
)
= eˆ1, (6)
where we recall that Z1A,k is the k-th share of Z
1
A, it follows that the output of the decoding
algorithm for the inputs Z1A and sy(Z
1
B) is the same as for the inputs Z
1
A,4 and sy(Z
1
A,1 ⊕
Z1A,2⊕Z1A,3⊕Z1B), with the crucial difference that the second approach does not compromise
the secrecy of Z1A. This is so because the CPAl ∈ A already know the fourth share Z1A,4 in
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advance (first input), and the information revealed by sy(Z1A,1 ⊕ Z1A,2 ⊕ Z1A,3 ⊕ Z1B) (second
input) is already accounted for in the secret key length formula. In order to implement this
second approach, CPB computes sy(Z
1
B) and sends it to the CPAl ∈ A. Then, the latter
individually compute sy(Z1A,1 ⊕ Z1A,2 ⊕ Z1A,3 ⊕ Z1B) by bitwise XOR-ing sy(Z1A,1), sy(Z1A,2),
sy(Z1A,3) and sy(Z
1
B). This task requires that, for k = 1, 2, 3, CPAk learns its missing
syndrome share, sy(ZkA). For this, CPAk requests the share to the remaining three units
(who certainly hold it) and applies MV. Finally, the CPAl ∈ A individually execute the
decoding algorithm.
VI. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION TOOLBOX
Below we present the secure MPC tools that we use in the post-processing scheme of the
experimental MDI-QKD implementation. For convenience, these tools are not described in
full generality, but they are particularised for the scenario in hand, where Alice holds four
CP units and at most one of them might be corrupted by an active adversary. For more
general descriptions, see for instance [3, 14].
A. Share protocol of a VSS scheme
Here, we explain the Share protocol that QKDAj uses to distribute shares of r
j|Ij ,Z.
1. QKDAj generates three random bit strings of length |rj|Ij ,Z|, denoted by Sj1, Sj2 and
Sj3. Then, it generates a fourth string defined as S
j
4 = S
j
1 ⊕ Sj2 ⊕ Sj3 ⊕ rj|Ij ,Z.
2. For k = 1, ..., 4, QKDAj sends S
j
k to every CPAl distinct from CPAk . Thus, by con-
struction, each unit will only be missing one share of rj|Ij ,Z. If a unit does not receive
a prescribed share, it takes this share to be a null bit string by default.
3. Let σk denote the set of units that hold the k-th share of r
j|Ij ,Z, Sjk. As an example,
σ1 = {CPA2 ,CPA3 ,CPA4}. For k = 1, ..., 4, all the units in σk send their copies of
Sjk to each other, in order to check that they are indeed equal. If a unit finds an
inconsistency, it raises a complaint through a (possibly simulated) broadcast channel
and QKDAj broadcasts S
j
k to all four units.
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B. Reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme
Here, we explain how the Reconstruct protocol of a VSS scheme runs for the reconstruc-
tion of the syndrome information syA = [sy(Z
1
A), sy(Z
2
A)] by Alice’s units. The reconstruc-
tion of the EV tag hEV(ZA) is performed identically.
Let us denote the k-th share of the sifted key ZjA by Z
j
A,k, which is obtained by sifting the
k-th share of rj|Ij ,Z. It follows that ZjA = ZjA,1⊕ZjA,2⊕ZjA,3⊕ZjA,4. Then, the k-th share of
sy(ZjA) is simply given by sy(Z
j
A,k), and the linearity of the syndrome function sy(·) implies
that
sy(ZjA) =
4⊕
k=1
sy
(
ZjA,k
)
. (7)
Moreover, by construction sy(ZjA,k) is the only share missing for CPAk , for all k = 1, . . . , 4.
For each j, the Reconstruct protocol of sy(ZjA) goes as follows.
1. For k = 1, ..., 4, each of the three units in σk sends its copy of sy(Z
j
A,k) to CPAk .
2. For each k, CPAk uses MV to decide on sy(Z
j
A,k) and later on bitwise XORs all the
shares to reconstruct sy(ZjA).
Crucially, the VSS scheme presented above (including both protocols, Share and Recon-
struct) enables information-theoretically secure MPC and is due to [3].
C. Random bit string (RBS) generation protocol
Below we present a simple procedure used by Alice’s CP units to create the random
bit-strings that specify the hash functions hEV and hPA, in the presence of a corrupted
unit. Remarkably, the protocol does not require any synchrony assumption among the
participating units.
1. CPA1 (CPA2) generates a random bit string R1 (R2) of a prefixed length and sends it
to CPA3 . If CPA3 does not receive, say Rj, it raises a complaint through a broadcast
channel and CPAj broadcasts this string.
2. CPA3 computes R = R1⊕R2 and sends it back to CPA1 and CPA2 . If a unit does not
receive R, it raises a complaint through a broadcast channel and CPA3 broadcasts this
string.
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3. CPA1 (CPA2) computes R2 = R ⊕ R1 (R1 = R ⊕ R2) and sends it to CPA2 (CPA1).
CPA2 (CPA1) checks that the string received from CPA1 (CPA2) matches the one it
sent to CPA3 in step 1. Otherwise, it raises a complaint and CPA3 broadcasts R. In
this case, CPA1 and CPA2 redo step 3.
Upon completion of steps 1 to 3, two honest units in A hold a common random string R.
Then, the three of them send R to CPA4 , which applies MV.
Let us briefly discuss the security of the protocol above. Due to the symmetric roles
of CPA1 and CPA2 , it suffices to address the case where, say CPA1 is dishonest, and the
case where CPA3 is dishonest. Let us first consider that CPA1 is dishonest. Then, CPA3 is
honest, which forces CPA1 to send him R1 before knowing R2. Since R2 is random due to
the honesty of CPA2 and R1 is uncorrelated to R2, the string R = R1 ⊕ R2 delivered by
CPA3 in step 2 is random. On the other hand, let us assume instead that CPA3 is dishonest.
Then, CPA1 and CPA2 are honest, in such a way that they generate random strings R1 and
R2, and either CPA3 delivers R = R1 ⊕ R2 to both CPA1 and CPA2 in step 3, or at least
one of them will complain, in which case CPA3 is forced to broadcast R. Step 3 is repeated
until the broadcasted value actually matches R1 ⊕ R2. Therefore, upon completion of the
protocol, both CPA1 and CPA2 end up with a common random string R1 ⊕R2.
We remark that, although the protocol above is tailored for the scenario where only one
CP unit might be corrupted and at least three CP units are available, a more general protocol
based on VSS can be found in [2]. This alternative protocol is guaranteed to succeed as long
as the number of honest CP units is larger than two thirds of the total number of units.
VII. AUTHENTICATION COST
To start up with, we list the classical messages of the protocol and specify their redun-
dancy (in brackets):
1. m1B =
[
b1|I1 , r′1|I1,X
]
and m2B =
[
b2|I2 , r′2|I2,X
]
(each of them sent by CPB to all three
CPAl ∈ A).
2. m1,SIFTA = Z1 and m2,SIFTA = Z2 (each of them sent by all three CPAl ∈ A to CPB).
3. mIR,PAA = [sy(Z
1
A), sy(Z
2
A), hEV(ZA), hEV, hPA] (sent by all three CPAl ∈ A to CPB).
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The authentication scheme we follow is described in [17]. Let us focus on any given
CPAl ∈ A. For the authentication of a message m (of arbitrary size) both CPAl and CPB
locally generate a common LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix, T , by drawing secret bits from
their pre-shared key pool (see Section IV of this Supplemental Information). The sending
unit computes the tag t = T × m and encrypts it later on using the one-time pad. The
encrypted tag is then attached to the message, and the overall key cost reduces to that of
encrypting the tag, i.e., |t| bits. That is to say, the secret bits consumed for the construction
of Toeplitz matrices remain secure and can be reallocated in the key pool.
For practical purposes, the length of every authentication tag is fixed to 64 bits in the
experiment. Moreover, from the list above, there exist five different messages: m1B, m
2
B,
m1,SIFTA , m
2,SIFT
A and m
IR,PA
A . Since each of them is redundantly sent three times, it follows
that, in total, authentication consumes lAU = 64× 5× 3 = 960 bits.
In addition, the error probability of the authentication scheme [17] is given by
γAU = |m|2−|t|+1. (8)
Therefore, the overall error probability AU of the authentication satisfies
AU ≤ 3
263
[
|m1B|+ |m2B|+
∣∣∣m1,SIFTA ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣m2,SIFTA ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣mIR,PAA ∣∣∣] . (9)
In fact, only the wrong authentication of those messages both sent and received by honest
CP units compromises the secrecy, meaning that the above formula can be made tighter.
Precisely, the prefactor 3 × 2−63 in Eq. (9) can be simplified to 2−62. Nevertheless, the
difference is not relevant due to the smallness of AU in either case. To finish with, we
list the precise message lengths below: |m1B| = 578333424 bits, |m2B| = 596429040 bits,∣∣∣m1,SIFTA ∣∣∣ = 578333424 bits, ∣∣∣m2,SIFTA ∣∣∣ = 596429040 bits, and ∣∣∣mIR,PAA ∣∣∣ = 267375807 bits. For
the last item, we used the fact that |sy(Z1A)| = λ1EC = 20863800 bits, |sy(Z2A)| = λ2EC =
21137832 bits, |hEV(ZA)| = tEV = 64 bits, |hEV| = 128 bits and |hPA| = 225373983 bits.
Putting it all together, it follows that AU ≈ 5.7× 10−10.
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